The "Redistribution of Wealth"

The "Redistribution of Wealth"

For a few years now, it's been a pointed question (or statement) from those on the political right: "Do you believe in the redistribution of wealth?"

The sequence of events goes something like this: A non-right wing politician or speaker advocates a policy, the right accuses them of "redistribution of wealth," then labels the policy or the speaker a
socialist, and brands them antithetical to all things American. The problem is that this is a radical coloring of language, and is manipulation of policy towards radical ends. The phrase itself is morally neutral, and is not socialist, or capitalist, or communist.

Public schools are paid for with property taxes. The money flows from every property owner in a school district to the public schools in that district, paying teachers directly in money and children in kind with education.  Public schools are thus a redistribution of wealth from property owners to teachers and children.

Military spending is paid for with federal income tax. The money flows from every individual paying federal income tax to the DOD, paying soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen directly in money, as well as paying the hundreds if not thousands of weapons manufacturers. The DOD is thus the redistribution of wealth from all people paying income taxes to soldiers and those who own and operate weapons manufacturing.

Social security too is redistribution of wealth, since there is no attempt to pay out only what an individual pays in, and college loans are also a redistribution of wealth, where the money flows from young students trying to earn a degree to the U.S. government, which is to say that our young people taking federal student loans are redistributing their own money to the whole population of the U.S.

To the accusation that the redistribution of wealth is socialism, the question isn't one of abstract theory, but of scale and execution: Public schools have existed for over two hundred years in the U.S. Are they a form of socialism? I would argue no; public schools are simply a choice made by the taxpaying public to invest in our future as a country, pay back some of the benefit they derive from having an educated populace, and create a sustainable system that will allow a younger person to someday have a successful life, just as so many of us who personally benefited from a public education have also done. Is the US military the manifestation of a socialist government? I sincerely doubt it.

(The definition of what is socialism is a larger question, but let's start with it being either the government owning the means of production, or of directing the use of all production in excess of that necessary to keep people alive back to the population at large, rather than allowing wealth to accrue in the hand of a minority at the top.  Neither applies to public schools or the military.)

Given all this, it's important to rip the phrase "redistribution of wealth" back from the hands of the radicals. We need to spend money on public schools to have educated children. We also need to spend money on the military to have it be effective. Both of these things have the effect of redistributing money from one group of people to another, and both are ESSENTIAL to a healthy society and a healthy country.

So the next time some political radical asks if you are for the redistribution of wealth, politely reply, "I'm not a socialist if that's what you're asking, but I do believe in paying back some of what I've earned to make the country better for our kids."

RIP Torqe 62

Rest In Peace to the crew of Torqe 62, flying out of Jalalabad, Afghanistan.  Part of the 39th Airlift Squadron at Dyess, stateside.

Capt Jonathan "JJ" Golden

Capt Jordan Pierson

SSgt Ryan D. Hammond

SrA Quinn Johnson-Harris

SrA Nathan Sartain

A1C Kcey Ruiz

(The spelling of "Torque 62" above, with no U after the Q, is probably due to the callsign assigned in theater, and is done deliberately.)

Think about the future

Here's how it will go:  20 years from now there will be a bunch of young Syrians who spent some time in Germany when they were young.  They will be in a rather unique demographic in that regard. What they remember of Germany and the western world will be pretty important, because what they remember 20 years from now will determine what they do 25 years from now.

Dear Mr. Stewart

A letter I wrote several years ago and never got around to sending.

///

Dear Mr. Stewart,

            As a younger and more idealistic person, I wanted to make the world a better place.  Unfortunately, being young and idealistic, I made some serious errors in the attempt.  For the younger me, finding myself stuck neck deep in the various events that made up the War on Terror (among other things), the world was a very depressing place.  As a country, our attempts to alleviate one problem were creating many more.  I was not the only person to see this, but those of us who did were few and far between; the day to day was very lonely.

            For all of miserable 2005, I felt like I was the only one noticing things like Haditha and the slide of Iraq into chaos.  For my own mental well-being, I really needed to see someone speak to the problems we were facing with honesty and courage, without being a pompous bore about it.  And that was you.  (And later, Mr. Colbert.)

            You are doing a lot of good for those of us out here who are paying attention to the important things and feel like we are voices in the wilderness.  Please don't stop.

Sincerely,

Dave Witt

P.S.: Is Rob Riggle really a major in the Marines? That's awesome! I don't suppose you have any use for a burnt out Air Force captain?

Iraq - it's our mess

A short explanation of the current situation in Iraq, October 2014, plus some opinion. I think I'm pretty good a differentiating between my opinion and objective facts, but read with discernment. Also, I list some references at the bottom, but this isn't an academic piece as I wanted speed over rigor.

What has been in the news lately have been the actions of the IS, or ISIS, or ISIL, which has taken over part of northwestern Iraq. The roots of ISIS go back to 1999 when it was founded by Zarqawi (killed 2006). Since 1999, it has changed names several times, for a time including the name Al Qaida in Iraq. It has been operating in Syria since the civil war began there a few years ago and was disowned by the original Al Qaida establishment in the spring of 2014 (for being too violent and radical!)

Following a few years of fighting in Syria, they have gained strength and moved into and taken over northeastern Iraq, breaking the country into roughly three large sections: The northwest, controlled by ISIS, mostly Sunni Islam, the northeast, mostly Kurds (who have a great deal autonomy, but are still formally part of Iraq and reporting to Baghdad), and the southeast, mostly Shia Islam.

A brief description of Sunnis and Shias: Sunnis in history accepted Abu Bakr as the first caliph following the death of the prophet Mohammed. Shias rejected Abu Bakr, and accepted instead Ali (Mohammed's cousin) as the first Caliph. The Sunni-Shia split is very roughly analogous to the split between Protestantism and Catholicism within Christianity; religion springing from the same source, but with significant doctrinal and customary differences. (Note that the leader of ISIS has adopted the name Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a clear reference to the seminal figure of Sunni Islam; in so doing, he is claiming power as Caliph.)

There are only two major countries in the world where Shia are in the majority: Iraq and Iran. Most of the rest of Islam is Sunni. In spite of this, Saddam Hussein was a Sunni, and was able to maintain control of Iraq by having Sunnis in all the major leadership positions. Because Saddam was a Sunni, he had the partial favor of Saudi Arabia (a Sunni country), because he prevented the Shia of Iran from joining with the Shia of Iraq and placing a possible hostile religious / political entity on SA's northern border. For this reason, when Iraq went to war with Iran in 1980, SA backed Saddam and provided him with weapons and other support (as did the US). (The Saudi's favorable view of Saddam changed when he invaded Kuwait in 1990 and became a larger threat to them (apparently) than Iran.)

This Sunni / Shia split in Iraq is a major influence on events there; its importance was suppressed under Saddam, because he had such brutal control over the country, he was able to maintain peace between the two factions. In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war, the Bush (41) Administration hoped that the shock and loss of the bulk of Iraqi military forces would make it possible for the Shia majority to overthrow Saddam, and in fact there was an uprising, but was unable to oust Saddam on its own, and Bush elected not to provide aide for them. Note that the no fly zones in northern and southern Iraq after '91 (Operations Northern and Southern Watch) were put in place partly to protect the Shia of the south and the Kurds of the north, both groups that Saddam had been quite violent with.

In the aftermath of our invasion in 2003, we had such loose control of the country that this split came to foreground and Sunnis and Shia began fighting each other quite bloodily, and we were unable to stop them. Interestingly, AQI was so radical and violent, they actually led to a reaction movement against them, the Sons of Iraq / Awakening movement, which we came to support.

In 2007, when it became apparent we were losing control of Iraq, I recall a press conference where someone actually asked the Bush (43) Whitehouse if they were considering splitting Iraq into three parts (the three parts mentioned above: Sunni northwest, Kurds northest, Shia southest) since it was these religious and ethnic differences that were causing friction and violence. The answer was no, and they went instead with the Petreaus plan to stabilize the country. I thought Iraq was too far gone to be saved and that the Surge would fail; happily, I was wrong. Petreaus was good enough to change the situation and stabilize it (and if you know his background, this is not a surprise), and we owe him an incredible debt for taking on and succeeding at that task.

At some point, we (the US / Bush administration) picked Nuri al-Maliki to head up the new Iraqi government (I don't know why). There are two problems with this choice: Maliki is an unabashed Shia, and built his govt to take care of Shia before all others. Second, he is very much enamored with Iran. So the story goes, the reason he wouldn't sign a Status Of Forces Agreement with us to leave troops in Iraq after 2011 is because Iran didn't want us there. In large part, it was Maliki's biased leadership and government which led to a Sunni backlash and created a favorable place for ISIS to move in.

Many of us knew or thought that leaving in 2011 was a mistake; Iraq was pretty healthy, but us leaving in 2011 was like taking a cast off a broken leg after the first week and walking on it again. I had friends who were out there shortly before the handover and they knew the Iraqis weren't ready. I had actually volunteered to be deployed for that fall and the handover, but was denied.

When we were first talking invasion in 2002 and 2003, I thought it was a mistake. There were quite a few of us in the military that were alike in this belief, but we were in the extreme minority, and in any case, of very low rank and in no position to affect the situation, unfortunately.

And then I spent most of my 20s going back and forth to Iraq and Afghanistan (mostly Iraq) trying to clean up the mess. Our invasion of Iraq was a strategic blunder of the highest order; it was a war of choice, and in a time and place not favorable to us. Politically, we were not prepared for a long occupation, and militarily we weren't prepared to have so many of our people deployed for so long, nor were we prepared for the nation-building mission that was required after the first six weeks were over. Further, it exposed us to counterattack by Al-Qaeda, which was their exact plan with 9/11 - to draw us into a lengthy and expensive fight close to home for them.

Having said all that, what should we do? I am of the belief that we broke it, we bought it. We chose to invade Iraq in 2003, no one forced us to do so. And having done so, we bear the responsibility to take care of the Iraq people, a responsibility that we have repeatedly handled very badly. Due to the lack of security we created in 2003, there were massive numbers of civilian casualties through 2007 (to say nothing of displaced refugees, and the loss of things like the libraries and museums of Baghdad that were looted). And we should have stayed on after 2011. And now, having allowed the situation to deteriorate again, we owe it to the Iraqi people to create stability, security, law and order, and give them a chance to decide their own future, and not have it forced on them by violent radicals.

So I am definitely in favor of airstrikes. And I could see a role for a limited number of US ground troops, but that may not be necessary; the Iraqi army is (or was) reasonably capable; with the overwhelming airpower we could bring to their aid, they should be able to mount a successful fight against ISIS.

It's our mess. We ought to clean it up.

Further reading:
Fiasco, by Thomas Ricks

Links:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levant
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunni
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osama_bin_laden
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saddam_hussein
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Bakr_al-Baghdadi
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_war
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuri_al-Maliki

Tooth versus Tail

One major factor in warfare that I find is often overlooked is the balancing
of the means available and thus the strategies that can be attempted.

The eternal tension between ends and means springs from the fact that the
natural human tendency is to envision the desired ends or objectives and
then stretch the means to meet them, rather than study the means (or
resources) and find an objective well within reach. Because of this, there
is a constant feedback loop from ends to means, as we seek a certain
outcome, find that it may not be possible, and either adapt our desires, or
attempt to expand our resources to meet the original goal. The way we get
from resources to objectives is our strategy or plan, and in the feedback
loop between means and ends, all three items (objectives, resources, and
strategies) all change. The balancing act is to not allow one factor alone
unbalance the whole of the equation, or allow a short term problem effect
long term planning. (Yarger 2006, 110)

This last problem is due another human tendency, that of prioritizing a
short term or immediate concern over a long term one.

As a concrete example of this concept, consider the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
The U.S. initially believed it would be a short war, and planned and
budgeted accordingly, with no money or troops set aside for stabilizing the
country after the shooting stopped. The objective was to remove Hussein and
create a stable, free, democratic Iraq. The means was the U.S. military
(and a certain amount of money allowed by Congress). The strategy was to
invade, remove Hussein, and hand the country over to the Iraqis.

After it became apparent that Iraq couldn't be a stable democratic nation
without a true occupation and years of nation-building, the U.S. had to
reconsider the points of the formula. A lengthy occupation would have both
a monetary cost and a cost in the readiness of the military. To leave in
late 2003 would mean to concede part of the objective (stable democratic
Iraq). Caught between these two horns, the U.S. decided to expand the
resources allocated and pursue the objective, even at the new, higher cost.
Because of this decision, the strategy likewise had to change, from one of
short term intense combat to one including years of peace keeping and
nation-building. (And then adapt strategy again in 2007 when it became
apparent that the current methods were failing.)

The possibility of error in balancing these three points gets accentuated
when the cycle time of decisions gets longer. For example, in the world of
American fighter aircraft design, it can take ten to twenty years to design
and field a fighter, before it even goes to the production line, and given
the expenses involved, there is usually only one fight in the design phase
at any time. In the intervening decade or so, the strategic environment can
change and thus create new conditions that the fighter currently entering
the fleet is not prepared for. This is the situation for the F-22 and F-35;
design work for both planes started before the end of the Cold War, when the
conflict the DOD was planning for was a massive conventional battle in
Western Europe versus the Warsaw Pact nations (and was budgeted
accordingly).

Today, a massive battle in Western Europe seems highly unlikely, and the US
is in the midst pivoting into the Pacific to meet growing Chinese military
dominance (after two highly unconventional wars), and doing so while cutting
military spending. In this new environment, a short range, single engine
fighter with stealthy capability and high operating cost (the F-35) may not
be the best choice, but the Air Force has chosen to go that route.
(Pietrucha 2014, 134) In doing so, it is retiring the A-10, leaving the Air
Force with no specialized ground attack capability, and cutting pay and
benefits for personnel (Tritten 2014), an action that will have consequences
for all those currently in the military and those yet to come in, lasting
twenty years or more. It may be that the F-35 will warrant those choices; I
doubt this, but only time will tell.

Yarger, Harry R. 2006. "Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army
War College Strategy Model." In U.S. Army War College Guide to National
Security Policy and Strategy, edited by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., 107-114.
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006.
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=708 (accessed
June 15, 2014).

Pietrucha, Michael W. 2014. The Comanche and the Albatross About Our Neck
Was Hung. Air & Space Power Journal May - Jun 2014: 133-156,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/article.asp?id=204 (accessed 16 June,
2014).

Tritten, Travis J. 2014. Over strong Joint Chiefs objections, House moves
to preserve military pay, benefits. Stripes.com, May 6,
http://www.stripes.com/over-strong-joint-chiefs-objections-house-moves-to-pr
eserve-military-pay-benefits-1.281766 (accessed 17 July, 2014).

Iraq

http://www.stripes.com/american-way-of-war-it-may-surprise-you-1.292182

I must respectfully disagree with the author. We could create a stable,
democratic government in Iraq, if we were committed to the task. Nation
building requires patience and commitment, which are hard to find in any
country when their sons and daughters are dying to protect and help another.
Patience is even harder to come by when it turns out the initiating event
was overstated or outright false.

The author quite accurately points out the negative pattern of American war
making, that of going to war quickly over an initiating event (real or
fabricated), and notes that in the case of Iraq, the narrative that led us
to war was false.

But Iraq is not (and never was) an impossible task; as an example of the
American capacity for nation-building, we almost single-handedly rebuilt
Japan, carried the lion's share of rebuilding Germany, as well heavily
assisting the rebuilding Europe in general after WWII, and did all three of
these things simultaneously, while ourselves transitioning from a war
economy to a peacetime one. Today it is inconceivable to think of the US
going to war with Japan or Germany, or they with us. We did nation-building
right in those places, and as a testament to our commitment there, we still
have bases in Germany and Japan. (I grant that the major reason for their
continued existence after nation-building was the Cold War.)

Agreed that our major mistake in Iraq was going there in the first place,
but nevertheless, we could have accomplished nation-building, were we
committed to it. Why weren't we? Because the stated reason for it didn't
ring true after IEDs started killing young Americans. Notably, the reason
for getting into WWII did stand the test of time, and we committed to
post-war reconstruction, while in both Iraq and Vietnam we had trumped up
reasons and sloppy execution. Both quickly became unpopular in the U.S.,
and both are (my opinion) failed wars. The lesson I would take from this is
that your reason for going to war better be solid, or society's support for
your actions won't be and you will be caught short.

Regarding the present situation there, I am in the
"we-broke-it-we-bought-it" school of thought. We, on our own authority,
subjected the Iraqi people to more than a decade of war and sloppy,
shortsighted postwar planning; for this reason we still have a moral duty to
them. I'm not saying we need to solve all their problems, or attempt to go
back en masse, but we owe them the actions necessary to spare them the
ravages of a long term civil war, and we should stop pretending that this
mess isn't our problem.