A short explanation of the current situation in Iraq, October 2014, plus some opinion. I think I'm pretty good a differentiating between my opinion and objective facts, but read with discernment. Also, I list some references at the bottom, but this isn't an academic piece as I wanted speed over rigor.
What has been in the news lately have been the actions of the IS, or ISIS, or ISIL, which has taken over part of northwestern Iraq. The roots of ISIS go back to 1999 when it was founded by Zarqawi (killed 2006). Since 1999, it has changed names several times, for a time including the name Al Qaida in Iraq. It has been operating in Syria since the civil war began there a few years ago and was disowned by the original Al Qaida establishment in the spring of 2014 (for being too violent and radical!)
Following a few years of fighting in Syria, they have gained strength and moved into and taken over northeastern Iraq, breaking the country into roughly three large sections: The northwest, controlled by ISIS, mostly Sunni Islam, the northeast, mostly Kurds (who have a great deal autonomy, but are still formally part of Iraq and reporting to Baghdad), and the southeast, mostly Shia Islam.
A brief description of Sunnis and Shias: Sunnis in history accepted Abu Bakr as the first caliph following the death of the prophet Mohammed. Shias rejected Abu Bakr, and accepted instead Ali (Mohammed's cousin) as the first Caliph. The Sunni-Shia split is very roughly analogous to the split between Protestantism and Catholicism within Christianity; religion springing from the same source, but with significant doctrinal and customary differences. (Note that the leader of ISIS has adopted the name Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a clear reference to the seminal figure of Sunni Islam; in so doing, he is claiming power as Caliph.)
There are only two major countries in the world where Shia are in the majority: Iraq and Iran. Most of the rest of Islam is Sunni. In spite of this, Saddam Hussein was a Sunni, and was able to maintain control of Iraq by having Sunnis in all the major leadership positions. Because Saddam was a Sunni, he had the partial favor of Saudi Arabia (a Sunni country), because he prevented the Shia of Iran from joining with the Shia of Iraq and placing a possible hostile religious / political entity on SA's northern border. For this reason, when Iraq went to war with Iran in 1980, SA backed Saddam and provided him with weapons and other support (as did the US). (The Saudi's favorable view of Saddam changed when he invaded Kuwait in 1990 and became a larger threat to them (apparently) than Iran.)
This Sunni / Shia split in Iraq is a major influence on events there; its importance was suppressed under Saddam, because he had such brutal control over the country, he was able to maintain peace between the two factions. In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war, the Bush (41) Administration hoped that the shock and loss of the bulk of Iraqi military forces would make it possible for the Shia majority to overthrow Saddam, and in fact there was an uprising, but was unable to oust Saddam on its own, and Bush elected not to provide aide for them. Note that the no fly zones in northern and southern Iraq after '91 (Operations Northern and Southern Watch) were put in place partly to protect the Shia of the south and the Kurds of the north, both groups that Saddam had been quite violent with.
In the aftermath of our invasion in 2003, we had such loose control of the country that this split came to foreground and Sunnis and Shia began fighting each other quite bloodily, and we were unable to stop them. Interestingly, AQI was so radical and violent, they actually led to a reaction movement against them, the Sons of Iraq / Awakening movement, which we came to support.
In 2007, when it became apparent we were losing control of Iraq, I recall a press conference where someone actually asked the Bush (43) Whitehouse if they were considering splitting Iraq into three parts (the three parts mentioned above: Sunni northwest, Kurds northest, Shia southest) since it was these religious and ethnic differences that were causing friction and violence. The answer was no, and they went instead with the Petreaus plan to stabilize the country. I thought Iraq was too far gone to be saved and that the Surge would fail; happily, I was wrong. Petreaus was good enough to change the situation and stabilize it (and if you know his background, this is not a surprise), and we owe him an incredible debt for taking on and succeeding at that task.
At some point, we (the US / Bush administration) picked Nuri al-Maliki to head up the new Iraqi government (I don't know why). There are two problems with this choice: Maliki is an unabashed Shia, and built his govt to take care of Shia before all others. Second, he is very much enamored with Iran. So the story goes, the reason he wouldn't sign a Status Of Forces Agreement with us to leave troops in Iraq after 2011 is because Iran didn't want us there. In large part, it was Maliki's biased leadership and government which led to a Sunni backlash and created a favorable place for ISIS to move in.
Many of us knew or thought that leaving in 2011 was a mistake; Iraq was pretty healthy, but us leaving in 2011 was like taking a cast off a broken leg after the first week and walking on it again. I had friends who were out there shortly before the handover and they knew the Iraqis weren't ready. I had actually volunteered to be deployed for that fall and the handover, but was denied.
When we were first talking invasion in 2002 and 2003, I thought it was a mistake. There were quite a few of us in the military that were alike in this belief, but we were in the extreme minority, and in any case, of very low rank and in no position to affect the situation, unfortunately.
And then I spent most of my 20s going back and forth to Iraq and Afghanistan (mostly Iraq) trying to clean up the mess. Our invasion of Iraq was a strategic blunder of the highest order; it was a war of choice, and in a time and place not favorable to us. Politically, we were not prepared for a long occupation, and militarily we weren't prepared to have so many of our people deployed for so long, nor were we prepared for the nation-building mission that was required after the first six weeks were over. Further, it exposed us to counterattack by Al-Qaeda, which was their exact plan with 9/11 - to draw us into a lengthy and expensive fight close to home for them.
Having said all that, what should we do? I am of the belief that we broke it, we bought it. We chose to invade Iraq in 2003, no one forced us to do so. And having done so, we bear the responsibility to take care of the Iraq people, a responsibility that we have repeatedly handled very badly. Due to the lack of security we created in 2003, there were massive numbers of civilian casualties through 2007 (to say nothing of displaced refugees, and the loss of things like the libraries and museums of Baghdad that were looted). And we should have stayed on after 2011. And now, having allowed the situation to deteriorate again, we owe it to the Iraqi people to create stability, security, law and order, and give them a chance to decide their own future, and not have it forced on them by violent radicals.
So I am definitely in favor of airstrikes. And I could see a role for a limited number of US ground troops, but that may not be necessary; the Iraqi army is (or was) reasonably capable; with the overwhelming airpower we could bring to their aid, they should be able to mount a successful fight against ISIS.
It's our mess. We ought to clean it up.
Further reading:
Fiasco, by Thomas Ricks
Links:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levant
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunni
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osama_bin_laden
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saddam_hussein
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Bakr_al-Baghdadi
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_war
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuri_al-Maliki
What has been in the news lately have been the actions of the IS, or ISIS, or ISIL, which has taken over part of northwestern Iraq. The roots of ISIS go back to 1999 when it was founded by Zarqawi (killed 2006). Since 1999, it has changed names several times, for a time including the name Al Qaida in Iraq. It has been operating in Syria since the civil war began there a few years ago and was disowned by the original Al Qaida establishment in the spring of 2014 (for being too violent and radical!)
Following a few years of fighting in Syria, they have gained strength and moved into and taken over northeastern Iraq, breaking the country into roughly three large sections: The northwest, controlled by ISIS, mostly Sunni Islam, the northeast, mostly Kurds (who have a great deal autonomy, but are still formally part of Iraq and reporting to Baghdad), and the southeast, mostly Shia Islam.
A brief description of Sunnis and Shias: Sunnis in history accepted Abu Bakr as the first caliph following the death of the prophet Mohammed. Shias rejected Abu Bakr, and accepted instead Ali (Mohammed's cousin) as the first Caliph. The Sunni-Shia split is very roughly analogous to the split between Protestantism and Catholicism within Christianity; religion springing from the same source, but with significant doctrinal and customary differences. (Note that the leader of ISIS has adopted the name Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a clear reference to the seminal figure of Sunni Islam; in so doing, he is claiming power as Caliph.)
There are only two major countries in the world where Shia are in the majority: Iraq and Iran. Most of the rest of Islam is Sunni. In spite of this, Saddam Hussein was a Sunni, and was able to maintain control of Iraq by having Sunnis in all the major leadership positions. Because Saddam was a Sunni, he had the partial favor of Saudi Arabia (a Sunni country), because he prevented the Shia of Iran from joining with the Shia of Iraq and placing a possible hostile religious / political entity on SA's northern border. For this reason, when Iraq went to war with Iran in 1980, SA backed Saddam and provided him with weapons and other support (as did the US). (The Saudi's favorable view of Saddam changed when he invaded Kuwait in 1990 and became a larger threat to them (apparently) than Iran.)
This Sunni / Shia split in Iraq is a major influence on events there; its importance was suppressed under Saddam, because he had such brutal control over the country, he was able to maintain peace between the two factions. In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war, the Bush (41) Administration hoped that the shock and loss of the bulk of Iraqi military forces would make it possible for the Shia majority to overthrow Saddam, and in fact there was an uprising, but was unable to oust Saddam on its own, and Bush elected not to provide aide for them. Note that the no fly zones in northern and southern Iraq after '91 (Operations Northern and Southern Watch) were put in place partly to protect the Shia of the south and the Kurds of the north, both groups that Saddam had been quite violent with.
In the aftermath of our invasion in 2003, we had such loose control of the country that this split came to foreground and Sunnis and Shia began fighting each other quite bloodily, and we were unable to stop them. Interestingly, AQI was so radical and violent, they actually led to a reaction movement against them, the Sons of Iraq / Awakening movement, which we came to support.
In 2007, when it became apparent we were losing control of Iraq, I recall a press conference where someone actually asked the Bush (43) Whitehouse if they were considering splitting Iraq into three parts (the three parts mentioned above: Sunni northwest, Kurds northest, Shia southest) since it was these religious and ethnic differences that were causing friction and violence. The answer was no, and they went instead with the Petreaus plan to stabilize the country. I thought Iraq was too far gone to be saved and that the Surge would fail; happily, I was wrong. Petreaus was good enough to change the situation and stabilize it (and if you know his background, this is not a surprise), and we owe him an incredible debt for taking on and succeeding at that task.
At some point, we (the US / Bush administration) picked Nuri al-Maliki to head up the new Iraqi government (I don't know why). There are two problems with this choice: Maliki is an unabashed Shia, and built his govt to take care of Shia before all others. Second, he is very much enamored with Iran. So the story goes, the reason he wouldn't sign a Status Of Forces Agreement with us to leave troops in Iraq after 2011 is because Iran didn't want us there. In large part, it was Maliki's biased leadership and government which led to a Sunni backlash and created a favorable place for ISIS to move in.
Many of us knew or thought that leaving in 2011 was a mistake; Iraq was pretty healthy, but us leaving in 2011 was like taking a cast off a broken leg after the first week and walking on it again. I had friends who were out there shortly before the handover and they knew the Iraqis weren't ready. I had actually volunteered to be deployed for that fall and the handover, but was denied.
When we were first talking invasion in 2002 and 2003, I thought it was a mistake. There were quite a few of us in the military that were alike in this belief, but we were in the extreme minority, and in any case, of very low rank and in no position to affect the situation, unfortunately.
And then I spent most of my 20s going back and forth to Iraq and Afghanistan (mostly Iraq) trying to clean up the mess. Our invasion of Iraq was a strategic blunder of the highest order; it was a war of choice, and in a time and place not favorable to us. Politically, we were not prepared for a long occupation, and militarily we weren't prepared to have so many of our people deployed for so long, nor were we prepared for the nation-building mission that was required after the first six weeks were over. Further, it exposed us to counterattack by Al-Qaeda, which was their exact plan with 9/11 - to draw us into a lengthy and expensive fight close to home for them.
Having said all that, what should we do? I am of the belief that we broke it, we bought it. We chose to invade Iraq in 2003, no one forced us to do so. And having done so, we bear the responsibility to take care of the Iraq people, a responsibility that we have repeatedly handled very badly. Due to the lack of security we created in 2003, there were massive numbers of civilian casualties through 2007 (to say nothing of displaced refugees, and the loss of things like the libraries and museums of Baghdad that were looted). And we should have stayed on after 2011. And now, having allowed the situation to deteriorate again, we owe it to the Iraqi people to create stability, security, law and order, and give them a chance to decide their own future, and not have it forced on them by violent radicals.
So I am definitely in favor of airstrikes. And I could see a role for a limited number of US ground troops, but that may not be necessary; the Iraqi army is (or was) reasonably capable; with the overwhelming airpower we could bring to their aid, they should be able to mount a successful fight against ISIS.
It's our mess. We ought to clean it up.
Further reading:
Fiasco, by Thomas Ricks
Links:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levant
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunni
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osama_bin_laden
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saddam_hussein
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Bakr_al-Baghdadi
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_war
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuri_al-Maliki
