The "Redistribution of Wealth"

The "Redistribution of Wealth"

For a few years now, it's been a pointed question (or statement) from those on the political right: "Do you believe in the redistribution of wealth?"

The sequence of events goes something like this: A non-right wing politician or speaker advocates a policy, the right accuses them of "redistribution of wealth," then labels the policy or the speaker a
socialist, and brands them antithetical to all things American. The problem is that this is a radical coloring of language, and is manipulation of policy towards radical ends. The phrase itself is morally neutral, and is not socialist, or capitalist, or communist.

Public schools are paid for with property taxes. The money flows from every property owner in a school district to the public schools in that district, paying teachers directly in money and children in kind with education.  Public schools are thus a redistribution of wealth from property owners to teachers and children.

Military spending is paid for with federal income tax. The money flows from every individual paying federal income tax to the DOD, paying soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen directly in money, as well as paying the hundreds if not thousands of weapons manufacturers. The DOD is thus the redistribution of wealth from all people paying income taxes to soldiers and those who own and operate weapons manufacturing.

Social security too is redistribution of wealth, since there is no attempt to pay out only what an individual pays in, and college loans are also a redistribution of wealth, where the money flows from young students trying to earn a degree to the U.S. government, which is to say that our young people taking federal student loans are redistributing their own money to the whole population of the U.S.

To the accusation that the redistribution of wealth is socialism, the question isn't one of abstract theory, but of scale and execution: Public schools have existed for over two hundred years in the U.S. Are they a form of socialism? I would argue no; public schools are simply a choice made by the taxpaying public to invest in our future as a country, pay back some of the benefit they derive from having an educated populace, and create a sustainable system that will allow a younger person to someday have a successful life, just as so many of us who personally benefited from a public education have also done. Is the US military the manifestation of a socialist government? I sincerely doubt it.

(The definition of what is socialism is a larger question, but let's start with it being either the government owning the means of production, or of directing the use of all production in excess of that necessary to keep people alive back to the population at large, rather than allowing wealth to accrue in the hand of a minority at the top.  Neither applies to public schools or the military.)

Given all this, it's important to rip the phrase "redistribution of wealth" back from the hands of the radicals. We need to spend money on public schools to have educated children. We also need to spend money on the military to have it be effective. Both of these things have the effect of redistributing money from one group of people to another, and both are ESSENTIAL to a healthy society and a healthy country.

So the next time some political radical asks if you are for the redistribution of wealth, politely reply, "I'm not a socialist if that's what you're asking, but I do believe in paying back some of what I've earned to make the country better for our kids."

Tooth versus Tail

One major factor in warfare that I find is often overlooked is the balancing
of the means available and thus the strategies that can be attempted.

The eternal tension between ends and means springs from the fact that the
natural human tendency is to envision the desired ends or objectives and
then stretch the means to meet them, rather than study the means (or
resources) and find an objective well within reach. Because of this, there
is a constant feedback loop from ends to means, as we seek a certain
outcome, find that it may not be possible, and either adapt our desires, or
attempt to expand our resources to meet the original goal. The way we get
from resources to objectives is our strategy or plan, and in the feedback
loop between means and ends, all three items (objectives, resources, and
strategies) all change. The balancing act is to not allow one factor alone
unbalance the whole of the equation, or allow a short term problem effect
long term planning. (Yarger 2006, 110)

This last problem is due another human tendency, that of prioritizing a
short term or immediate concern over a long term one.

As a concrete example of this concept, consider the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
The U.S. initially believed it would be a short war, and planned and
budgeted accordingly, with no money or troops set aside for stabilizing the
country after the shooting stopped. The objective was to remove Hussein and
create a stable, free, democratic Iraq. The means was the U.S. military
(and a certain amount of money allowed by Congress). The strategy was to
invade, remove Hussein, and hand the country over to the Iraqis.

After it became apparent that Iraq couldn't be a stable democratic nation
without a true occupation and years of nation-building, the U.S. had to
reconsider the points of the formula. A lengthy occupation would have both
a monetary cost and a cost in the readiness of the military. To leave in
late 2003 would mean to concede part of the objective (stable democratic
Iraq). Caught between these two horns, the U.S. decided to expand the
resources allocated and pursue the objective, even at the new, higher cost.
Because of this decision, the strategy likewise had to change, from one of
short term intense combat to one including years of peace keeping and
nation-building. (And then adapt strategy again in 2007 when it became
apparent that the current methods were failing.)

The possibility of error in balancing these three points gets accentuated
when the cycle time of decisions gets longer. For example, in the world of
American fighter aircraft design, it can take ten to twenty years to design
and field a fighter, before it even goes to the production line, and given
the expenses involved, there is usually only one fight in the design phase
at any time. In the intervening decade or so, the strategic environment can
change and thus create new conditions that the fighter currently entering
the fleet is not prepared for. This is the situation for the F-22 and F-35;
design work for both planes started before the end of the Cold War, when the
conflict the DOD was planning for was a massive conventional battle in
Western Europe versus the Warsaw Pact nations (and was budgeted
accordingly).

Today, a massive battle in Western Europe seems highly unlikely, and the US
is in the midst pivoting into the Pacific to meet growing Chinese military
dominance (after two highly unconventional wars), and doing so while cutting
military spending. In this new environment, a short range, single engine
fighter with stealthy capability and high operating cost (the F-35) may not
be the best choice, but the Air Force has chosen to go that route.
(Pietrucha 2014, 134) In doing so, it is retiring the A-10, leaving the Air
Force with no specialized ground attack capability, and cutting pay and
benefits for personnel (Tritten 2014), an action that will have consequences
for all those currently in the military and those yet to come in, lasting
twenty years or more. It may be that the F-35 will warrant those choices; I
doubt this, but only time will tell.

Yarger, Harry R. 2006. "Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army
War College Strategy Model." In U.S. Army War College Guide to National
Security Policy and Strategy, edited by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., 107-114.
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006.
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=708 (accessed
June 15, 2014).

Pietrucha, Michael W. 2014. The Comanche and the Albatross About Our Neck
Was Hung. Air & Space Power Journal May - Jun 2014: 133-156,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/article.asp?id=204 (accessed 16 June,
2014).

Tritten, Travis J. 2014. Over strong Joint Chiefs objections, House moves
to preserve military pay, benefits. Stripes.com, May 6,
http://www.stripes.com/over-strong-joint-chiefs-objections-house-moves-to-pr
eserve-military-pay-benefits-1.281766 (accessed 17 July, 2014).