RIP Torqe 62

Rest In Peace to the crew of Torqe 62, flying out of Jalalabad, Afghanistan.  Part of the 39th Airlift Squadron at Dyess, stateside.

Capt Jonathan "JJ" Golden

Capt Jordan Pierson

SSgt Ryan D. Hammond

SrA Quinn Johnson-Harris

SrA Nathan Sartain

A1C Kcey Ruiz

(The spelling of "Torque 62" above, with no U after the Q, is probably due to the callsign assigned in theater, and is done deliberately.)

Dear Mr. Stewart

A letter I wrote several years ago and never got around to sending.

///

Dear Mr. Stewart,

            As a younger and more idealistic person, I wanted to make the world a better place.  Unfortunately, being young and idealistic, I made some serious errors in the attempt.  For the younger me, finding myself stuck neck deep in the various events that made up the War on Terror (among other things), the world was a very depressing place.  As a country, our attempts to alleviate one problem were creating many more.  I was not the only person to see this, but those of us who did were few and far between; the day to day was very lonely.

            For all of miserable 2005, I felt like I was the only one noticing things like Haditha and the slide of Iraq into chaos.  For my own mental well-being, I really needed to see someone speak to the problems we were facing with honesty and courage, without being a pompous bore about it.  And that was you.  (And later, Mr. Colbert.)

            You are doing a lot of good for those of us out here who are paying attention to the important things and feel like we are voices in the wilderness.  Please don't stop.

Sincerely,

Dave Witt

P.S.: Is Rob Riggle really a major in the Marines? That's awesome! I don't suppose you have any use for a burnt out Air Force captain?

Iraq - it's our mess

A short explanation of the current situation in Iraq, October 2014, plus some opinion. I think I'm pretty good a differentiating between my opinion and objective facts, but read with discernment. Also, I list some references at the bottom, but this isn't an academic piece as I wanted speed over rigor.

What has been in the news lately have been the actions of the IS, or ISIS, or ISIL, which has taken over part of northwestern Iraq. The roots of ISIS go back to 1999 when it was founded by Zarqawi (killed 2006). Since 1999, it has changed names several times, for a time including the name Al Qaida in Iraq. It has been operating in Syria since the civil war began there a few years ago and was disowned by the original Al Qaida establishment in the spring of 2014 (for being too violent and radical!)

Following a few years of fighting in Syria, they have gained strength and moved into and taken over northeastern Iraq, breaking the country into roughly three large sections: The northwest, controlled by ISIS, mostly Sunni Islam, the northeast, mostly Kurds (who have a great deal autonomy, but are still formally part of Iraq and reporting to Baghdad), and the southeast, mostly Shia Islam.

A brief description of Sunnis and Shias: Sunnis in history accepted Abu Bakr as the first caliph following the death of the prophet Mohammed. Shias rejected Abu Bakr, and accepted instead Ali (Mohammed's cousin) as the first Caliph. The Sunni-Shia split is very roughly analogous to the split between Protestantism and Catholicism within Christianity; religion springing from the same source, but with significant doctrinal and customary differences. (Note that the leader of ISIS has adopted the name Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a clear reference to the seminal figure of Sunni Islam; in so doing, he is claiming power as Caliph.)

There are only two major countries in the world where Shia are in the majority: Iraq and Iran. Most of the rest of Islam is Sunni. In spite of this, Saddam Hussein was a Sunni, and was able to maintain control of Iraq by having Sunnis in all the major leadership positions. Because Saddam was a Sunni, he had the partial favor of Saudi Arabia (a Sunni country), because he prevented the Shia of Iran from joining with the Shia of Iraq and placing a possible hostile religious / political entity on SA's northern border. For this reason, when Iraq went to war with Iran in 1980, SA backed Saddam and provided him with weapons and other support (as did the US). (The Saudi's favorable view of Saddam changed when he invaded Kuwait in 1990 and became a larger threat to them (apparently) than Iran.)

This Sunni / Shia split in Iraq is a major influence on events there; its importance was suppressed under Saddam, because he had such brutal control over the country, he was able to maintain peace between the two factions. In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war, the Bush (41) Administration hoped that the shock and loss of the bulk of Iraqi military forces would make it possible for the Shia majority to overthrow Saddam, and in fact there was an uprising, but was unable to oust Saddam on its own, and Bush elected not to provide aide for them. Note that the no fly zones in northern and southern Iraq after '91 (Operations Northern and Southern Watch) were put in place partly to protect the Shia of the south and the Kurds of the north, both groups that Saddam had been quite violent with.

In the aftermath of our invasion in 2003, we had such loose control of the country that this split came to foreground and Sunnis and Shia began fighting each other quite bloodily, and we were unable to stop them. Interestingly, AQI was so radical and violent, they actually led to a reaction movement against them, the Sons of Iraq / Awakening movement, which we came to support.

In 2007, when it became apparent we were losing control of Iraq, I recall a press conference where someone actually asked the Bush (43) Whitehouse if they were considering splitting Iraq into three parts (the three parts mentioned above: Sunni northwest, Kurds northest, Shia southest) since it was these religious and ethnic differences that were causing friction and violence. The answer was no, and they went instead with the Petreaus plan to stabilize the country. I thought Iraq was too far gone to be saved and that the Surge would fail; happily, I was wrong. Petreaus was good enough to change the situation and stabilize it (and if you know his background, this is not a surprise), and we owe him an incredible debt for taking on and succeeding at that task.

At some point, we (the US / Bush administration) picked Nuri al-Maliki to head up the new Iraqi government (I don't know why). There are two problems with this choice: Maliki is an unabashed Shia, and built his govt to take care of Shia before all others. Second, he is very much enamored with Iran. So the story goes, the reason he wouldn't sign a Status Of Forces Agreement with us to leave troops in Iraq after 2011 is because Iran didn't want us there. In large part, it was Maliki's biased leadership and government which led to a Sunni backlash and created a favorable place for ISIS to move in.

Many of us knew or thought that leaving in 2011 was a mistake; Iraq was pretty healthy, but us leaving in 2011 was like taking a cast off a broken leg after the first week and walking on it again. I had friends who were out there shortly before the handover and they knew the Iraqis weren't ready. I had actually volunteered to be deployed for that fall and the handover, but was denied.

When we were first talking invasion in 2002 and 2003, I thought it was a mistake. There were quite a few of us in the military that were alike in this belief, but we were in the extreme minority, and in any case, of very low rank and in no position to affect the situation, unfortunately.

And then I spent most of my 20s going back and forth to Iraq and Afghanistan (mostly Iraq) trying to clean up the mess. Our invasion of Iraq was a strategic blunder of the highest order; it was a war of choice, and in a time and place not favorable to us. Politically, we were not prepared for a long occupation, and militarily we weren't prepared to have so many of our people deployed for so long, nor were we prepared for the nation-building mission that was required after the first six weeks were over. Further, it exposed us to counterattack by Al-Qaeda, which was their exact plan with 9/11 - to draw us into a lengthy and expensive fight close to home for them.

Having said all that, what should we do? I am of the belief that we broke it, we bought it. We chose to invade Iraq in 2003, no one forced us to do so. And having done so, we bear the responsibility to take care of the Iraq people, a responsibility that we have repeatedly handled very badly. Due to the lack of security we created in 2003, there were massive numbers of civilian casualties through 2007 (to say nothing of displaced refugees, and the loss of things like the libraries and museums of Baghdad that were looted). And we should have stayed on after 2011. And now, having allowed the situation to deteriorate again, we owe it to the Iraqi people to create stability, security, law and order, and give them a chance to decide their own future, and not have it forced on them by violent radicals.

So I am definitely in favor of airstrikes. And I could see a role for a limited number of US ground troops, but that may not be necessary; the Iraqi army is (or was) reasonably capable; with the overwhelming airpower we could bring to their aid, they should be able to mount a successful fight against ISIS.

It's our mess. We ought to clean it up.

Further reading:
Fiasco, by Thomas Ricks

Links:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levant
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunni
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osama_bin_laden
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saddam_hussein
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Bakr_al-Baghdadi
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_war
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuri_al-Maliki

Tooth versus Tail

One major factor in warfare that I find is often overlooked is the balancing
of the means available and thus the strategies that can be attempted.

The eternal tension between ends and means springs from the fact that the
natural human tendency is to envision the desired ends or objectives and
then stretch the means to meet them, rather than study the means (or
resources) and find an objective well within reach. Because of this, there
is a constant feedback loop from ends to means, as we seek a certain
outcome, find that it may not be possible, and either adapt our desires, or
attempt to expand our resources to meet the original goal. The way we get
from resources to objectives is our strategy or plan, and in the feedback
loop between means and ends, all three items (objectives, resources, and
strategies) all change. The balancing act is to not allow one factor alone
unbalance the whole of the equation, or allow a short term problem effect
long term planning. (Yarger 2006, 110)

This last problem is due another human tendency, that of prioritizing a
short term or immediate concern over a long term one.

As a concrete example of this concept, consider the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
The U.S. initially believed it would be a short war, and planned and
budgeted accordingly, with no money or troops set aside for stabilizing the
country after the shooting stopped. The objective was to remove Hussein and
create a stable, free, democratic Iraq. The means was the U.S. military
(and a certain amount of money allowed by Congress). The strategy was to
invade, remove Hussein, and hand the country over to the Iraqis.

After it became apparent that Iraq couldn't be a stable democratic nation
without a true occupation and years of nation-building, the U.S. had to
reconsider the points of the formula. A lengthy occupation would have both
a monetary cost and a cost in the readiness of the military. To leave in
late 2003 would mean to concede part of the objective (stable democratic
Iraq). Caught between these two horns, the U.S. decided to expand the
resources allocated and pursue the objective, even at the new, higher cost.
Because of this decision, the strategy likewise had to change, from one of
short term intense combat to one including years of peace keeping and
nation-building. (And then adapt strategy again in 2007 when it became
apparent that the current methods were failing.)

The possibility of error in balancing these three points gets accentuated
when the cycle time of decisions gets longer. For example, in the world of
American fighter aircraft design, it can take ten to twenty years to design
and field a fighter, before it even goes to the production line, and given
the expenses involved, there is usually only one fight in the design phase
at any time. In the intervening decade or so, the strategic environment can
change and thus create new conditions that the fighter currently entering
the fleet is not prepared for. This is the situation for the F-22 and F-35;
design work for both planes started before the end of the Cold War, when the
conflict the DOD was planning for was a massive conventional battle in
Western Europe versus the Warsaw Pact nations (and was budgeted
accordingly).

Today, a massive battle in Western Europe seems highly unlikely, and the US
is in the midst pivoting into the Pacific to meet growing Chinese military
dominance (after two highly unconventional wars), and doing so while cutting
military spending. In this new environment, a short range, single engine
fighter with stealthy capability and high operating cost (the F-35) may not
be the best choice, but the Air Force has chosen to go that route.
(Pietrucha 2014, 134) In doing so, it is retiring the A-10, leaving the Air
Force with no specialized ground attack capability, and cutting pay and
benefits for personnel (Tritten 2014), an action that will have consequences
for all those currently in the military and those yet to come in, lasting
twenty years or more. It may be that the F-35 will warrant those choices; I
doubt this, but only time will tell.

Yarger, Harry R. 2006. "Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army
War College Strategy Model." In U.S. Army War College Guide to National
Security Policy and Strategy, edited by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., 107-114.
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006.
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=708 (accessed
June 15, 2014).

Pietrucha, Michael W. 2014. The Comanche and the Albatross About Our Neck
Was Hung. Air & Space Power Journal May - Jun 2014: 133-156,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/article.asp?id=204 (accessed 16 June,
2014).

Tritten, Travis J. 2014. Over strong Joint Chiefs objections, House moves
to preserve military pay, benefits. Stripes.com, May 6,
http://www.stripes.com/over-strong-joint-chiefs-objections-house-moves-to-pr
eserve-military-pay-benefits-1.281766 (accessed 17 July, 2014).

Iraq

http://www.stripes.com/american-way-of-war-it-may-surprise-you-1.292182

I must respectfully disagree with the author. We could create a stable,
democratic government in Iraq, if we were committed to the task. Nation
building requires patience and commitment, which are hard to find in any
country when their sons and daughters are dying to protect and help another.
Patience is even harder to come by when it turns out the initiating event
was overstated or outright false.

The author quite accurately points out the negative pattern of American war
making, that of going to war quickly over an initiating event (real or
fabricated), and notes that in the case of Iraq, the narrative that led us
to war was false.

But Iraq is not (and never was) an impossible task; as an example of the
American capacity for nation-building, we almost single-handedly rebuilt
Japan, carried the lion's share of rebuilding Germany, as well heavily
assisting the rebuilding Europe in general after WWII, and did all three of
these things simultaneously, while ourselves transitioning from a war
economy to a peacetime one. Today it is inconceivable to think of the US
going to war with Japan or Germany, or they with us. We did nation-building
right in those places, and as a testament to our commitment there, we still
have bases in Germany and Japan. (I grant that the major reason for their
continued existence after nation-building was the Cold War.)

Agreed that our major mistake in Iraq was going there in the first place,
but nevertheless, we could have accomplished nation-building, were we
committed to it. Why weren't we? Because the stated reason for it didn't
ring true after IEDs started killing young Americans. Notably, the reason
for getting into WWII did stand the test of time, and we committed to
post-war reconstruction, while in both Iraq and Vietnam we had trumped up
reasons and sloppy execution. Both quickly became unpopular in the U.S.,
and both are (my opinion) failed wars. The lesson I would take from this is
that your reason for going to war better be solid, or society's support for
your actions won't be and you will be caught short.

Regarding the present situation there, I am in the
"we-broke-it-we-bought-it" school of thought. We, on our own authority,
subjected the Iraqi people to more than a decade of war and sloppy,
shortsighted postwar planning; for this reason we still have a moral duty to
them. I'm not saying we need to solve all their problems, or attempt to go
back en masse, but we owe them the actions necessary to spare them the
ravages of a long term civil war, and we should stop pretending that this
mess isn't our problem.

Veterans

Just read an article by Joe Klein, "The New Greatest Generation," good
stuff.

If you want to know about the good things in the US military, this is a
great place to start.

Some quotes:

'"The toughest part of leadership is telling people they have to do
something that involves pain," says Eric Greitens, a former Navy SEAL...'
'The inevitable military acronym for the five-paragraph memo is SMESC, and
the mnemonic device is "Sergeant major eats sugar cookies." Situation:
What's the problem? Mission: What's our strategy for solving it? Execution:
What tactics are we going to use? Support: What are the logistics; how many
troops and what sort of equipment will we need? Command: What other
organizations (air strikes, aerial reconnaissance, Afghan security forces)
will have to be involved?'

(I just read about this in ACSC; this is the same format used in CONPLANs
and OPLANs, that is to say, formal war planning documents.)

'They feel closer to one another than they do to either political
party...most of my friends feel politically homeless...neither party
reflected the combination of service and get-it-done pragmatism most
veterans value.'

'I once asked Moore whether the skills he learned in the Army had any
influence on his life as a civilian. "Absolutely! On every big decision I
make," he said and began to tell me about his tour as a counterintelligence
officer in a difficult section of eastern Afghanistan. "People have the
wrong impression of the military," he said. "It is extremely
entrepreneurial. I had more freedom to make decisions there than I do at
Citibank. My commander would tell me what needed to be done, and then it was
up to me to figure out how to do it." '

'There is a basic altruism. Gallina intuitively expanded the notion that you
don't leave a fallen comrade in the field to include the veterans of other
wars; from there, it's a short jump to including civilians as members of
their community too. Veterans are trained to believe that everyone in their
unit rises and falls together. "In the military, it's never about you,"
Lewis told me. "It's always about something larger." '

'"I was looking for something to fill the void. It was like losing your
family." Then McNulty invited him to join an Alabama tornado-relief crew. "I
rented a chainsaw, and within 20 minutes it felt like I was back in the
service again. We shared a common language and knew how to organize
ourselves to work efficiently... '

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2089337,00.html

Tags: links, leadership, war, history, pers, psychology, politics

Libya

So, an old friend of mine recently wrote to catch up and noted there'd been no new entries here since nov'10. I have been very busy with work (in spite of my new years resolution.) I had another friend write to talk about what was going on in Libya and it was an interesting convo. I will post it here when I get home(currently on the road).

Sal Guinta

This still won't be a full entry, but there is a very timely quote that I heard today.

I saw SSgt Sal Guinta interviewed today, and he said that he didn't really feel the Medal of Honor was appropriate for him, or perhaps that what he had done wasn't necessarily all that exceptional.  When asked why, he said, "It's not about me...in all the times I've been in combat in Afghanistan, I've never been alone, I've never been shot at alone, I've never been left alone, since I've been in the Army."  He went on to note that he was part of team, and that the team accomplishments were more relevant.

In the Air Force, it has been the same for me.  This is the single largest thing that I could critique about the movie the Hurt Locker; so often the characters, or the small team, seems isolated, and alone.  They frequently separate, and almost never talk to the units or the people around them.  This is not the American way of war...you are never alone.  If you are, something is very very wrong.

As well, I deeply admire his honesty and humility.  Another quote that I found after searching his name, this one is even more eloquent: ."I did what I did because in the scheme of painting the picture of that ambush, that was just my brush stroke. That’s not above and beyond. I didn’t take the biggest brush stroke, and it wasn’t the most important brush stroke."



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvatore_Giunta

http://iloaktree.blogspot.com/2010/06/hurt-locker.html

TBI

Got the following email several months back, finally posting it...and it happens to be timely for Veteran's Day.
~~~

-----Original Message-----
From: Travers, Chelsea [mailto:Ctravers@caremeridian.com]
Sent: Thursday, April 22, 2010 06:59
To: davewitt
Subject: RE: Question/Website

Hi David,

Thank you for getting back to me. I have gone ahead and attached the article to this email, it contains a few reference links. If you do decide to use the article do you think you could do me a favor and send me an email letting me know that the article is up? I would really appreciate it.

Thank you again for your help and support!

Take Care,

Chelsea


-----Original Message-----
From: David Witt
Sent: Wed 4/21/2010 9:10 PM
To: Travers, Chelsea
Subject: RE: Question/Website

Chelsea,

Sure, please send me the article.

d

  _____ 

From: Travers, Chelsea [mailto:Ctravers@caremeridian.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2010 14:38
To: davewitt
Subject: Question/Website

Hi,

My name is Chelsea.  I am contacting you on behalf of CareMeridian
(caremeridian.com). CareMeridian is a well known subacute and skilled
nursing/rehabilitation facility located throughout the Western United States
for patients suffering from traumatic brain injury, spinal cord injury, or
medical complexities such as neuromuscular or congenital anomalies.  Brain
injuries are becoming all too commonly associated with modern warfare.  Many
veterans return home with brain injuries without knowing they are suffering
from them. Members of the US Department of Veterans Affairs have even coined
brain injuries as the "signature wound" of the War on Terror. To raise
awareness I was hoping that I could offer you an original article about TBI
as it relates to warfare, that you could post on your website
(iloaktree.blogspot.com).

Please let me know if this is something you'd be interested in.  If you have
any questions please do not hesitate to contact me directly at this email
address.

Best regards,

Chelsea Travers
ctravers@caremeridian.com
~~~

Traumatic Brain Injuries and the Military

Military men and women are continually involved situations where risk of injury is high. One silent war wound that can often go unnoticed is a traumatic brain injury (TBI) . A TBI damages the brain that can often cause life-altering wounds, which can result in changes in personality, behavior, and even the brain functions of the victim. Some of these conditions are not just life-altering, but can be life threatening and are often partnered with rehabilitation from special care facilities like CareMeridian Las Vegas nursing home.

According to the Veterans Health Initiative, active male members of the military were hospitalized due to TBI related injuries at a rate of 231 per 100,000. The rate for female members of the military was 150 per 100,000. Based on these statistics over 4,000 military personnel are hospitalized on average each year for traumatic brain injuries. Some are as mild as a concussion, while others can be severe and have life altering effects.

The best way to prevent TBI is through awareness. Recognizing and responding to the symptoms of a TBI can often aid in the preventing further damage caused by the injury. Dizziness, headaches, changes in personality or sleep patterns, and memory loss are clear signs of TBI. Unfortunately these symptoms can sometimes be ignored or discarded as minor pains during times of conflict and even once the solider returns home. This sets up a dangerous precedent for a war wound that may never heal, so it is vital that serviceman and their families are aware of TBI, so that they can recognize and help treat it if symptoms are present.

The GWOT

Just a thought I had as I was studying my Air Force doctrine / PME on the War on Terror.

We invaded Iraq and Afghanistan in prosecuting the war not because this was (necessarily) a direct attack on AQ, but because we believed they were terrorist safe havens. We needed a way to disrupt those safe havens. We chose regime change, and specifically regime change through direct armed intervention.

The Hurt Locker

I've been trying to decide whether or not to write an entry on The Hurt Locker. I finally decided to, because of the movie Restrepo. I didn't know they were making a movie; I saw the author of the book interviewed on The Daily Show and that alone was moving. I'm planning on watching it on the 4th of July, if not sooner.

Expect another entry on Hurt Locker, like what they got right and what they got wrong.

http://www.restrepothemovie.com/

As you entered the banquet hall this evening, you may have noticed a small table here in a place of honor near our head table. It is set for one. Please let me explain. The military caste is filled with symbolism. This table is our way of symbolizing the fact that members of our profession of arms are missing from our midst. They are commonly referred to as P.O.W./M.I.A. We call them "Brothers". They are unable to be with us this evening, and so we remember them because of their incarceration.

*
This TABLE set for one is small - symbolizing the frailty of one prisoner alone against his oppressors.

*
The TABLECLOTH is white - symbolizing the purity of their intentions to respond to their country's call to arms.

*
The single ROSE displayed in a vase reminds us of the families and loved ones of our comrades-in-arms who keep the faith awaiting their return.

*
The RED RIBBON tied so prominently on the vase is reminiscent of the red ribbon worn on the lapel and breasts of thousands who bear witness to their unyielding determination to demand a proper accounting of our missing.

*
A SLICE OF LEMON is on the bread plate to remind us of their bitter fate.

*
There is SALT upon the bread plate - symbolic of their families' tears as they wait.

*
The GLASS is inverted - they can not toast with us this night.

*
The CHAIR - the chair is empty - they are not here.

REMEMBER - all of you who served with them and called them comrades, who depended upon their might and aid, and relied upon them, for surely, they have not forsaken you.


~~~
http://www.homeofheroes.com/hallofheroes/1st_floor/flag/1bfb_disp9cc.html

http://regimentalrogue.tripod.com/srsub/mess_dinner_organization_c.htm

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toast_%28honor%29

always ready

The war waits for no man...

link

Gitmo

For pity's sake. Seriously?

Congress denied the funding to close Gitmo.

Okay, I don't have much time for anything but sleep these days, so pardon the lack of finesse: the threat posed by those in Gitmo is now and always has been overstated. We are all surrounded, all the time, by much more dangerous criminals, safely contained in the same prisons we could put these guys in. Gitmo itself is a continuing blemish on our reputation as a just and democratic nation, and makes it harder to fight this war. It should be closed immediately.

How to pack Care Packages

I have a bunch of friends overseas right now, so I've been putting together a few care packages lately. Some guidelines I like to follow:

Just like emails, care packages work best if they are smaller, but arrive more frequently. The fact that you get something is the best part, not that it's perfect.

Remember these are items that need to keep well, and be eaten on the move, and may well get very hot and very cold on the way.

The process takes a lot of steps, which is why it is hard to complete sometimes. (I had some friends tell me after I got back last June that they had put a package together for me, then never gotten around to mailing it, and eventually started eating it as sat on their kitchen counter. It made me laugh because I have done that myself.) They are: get a mailing address. Buy the stuff. Pack the box. Take it to post office to mail. (You have to do this because it is going overseas, and you have to fill out a customs form).

So, what I usually do is the the address from an email they sent, put it on a post note, and stick that note on the box I intend to use. Once again, the box doesn't need to be huge. 10" X 13" X 5" is a good size. Then I go and buy things at the store and repack them in the box, which I throw in the car and mail the next time I can.

Items I like to include:
A note. ANY news from not-in-the-desert is entertaining!

Triscuits (or other crackers like Ritz, Saltines, etc. Buy the small box and leave the crackers in it.)

Easy cheese. (One can per box of crackers.)

Summer sausage. (Nice because it comes sealed in plastic, and keeps well. Also, after you open it, you can slice easily, and put on the crackers, but it isn't as messy as tuna or (shudder) Spam.)

Chocolate. I like the fun sizes of Snickers, Butterfingers, Baby Ruth, etc. I buy the big bags and then repack them in 1 quart ziploc bags. This makes them a little easier to carry and share, and also contains liquid chocolate if the package gets hot on the way. Also the ziploc bag is often useful afterwards.

Drink mix. Obviously it is difficult (though not impossible) to mail liquids. Unless someone is really jonesing for a particular beverage they can't get downrange, get the drink mix instead.
(See note on alcohol below.) I also takes these out of the original box and put in mini ziploc bags.

Cookies. I buy the variety packs of small (~2 oz) bags of things like Cheeze its, Animal Crackers, frosted animal crackers, mini oreos, mini chocolate chip cookies, Nilla Wafers, etc. The small bags let you avoid repacking them yourself. I open the box and put the small bags in the care package loose, they also act nicely as padding.

Other candy. Fruit roll ups, gummi bears, twizzlers, etc. Again I look for small bags, or I rebag them myself.

Beef jerky.

Trail mix.

Other stuff: Current magazines, books, small cheap toys like legos or suction cup dart guns or matchbox cars.

Illegal items:
Booze
Porno (Note that the CENTCOM version of porno means "any depiction of a female body above the ankles, between the wrists, and below the neck." Not kidding.)
Bibles or other religious materials.

(For those of you who speak military, possession of these items will generally get a military member an at least an Article 15 off the bat, no questions asked. For those of you that don't, that's bad.)

Once you get into a decent rhythm, you can start customizing based on inputs from them, but don't stall out on the process, or you'll never get them mailed. If you don't hear from whoever, just mail it generic. Oh, and if they have their address before they leave, pack one and mail it the same day they do so they will get it a couple of weeks after they arrive.

Oh, also: Do yourself and the person you are mailing it to a favor: Don't use their rank in the address, and leave as little return address information as possible (magazine mailing labels, for example). Anyone downrange should be shredding or burning address information from inbound mail, but make their job easier - don't write it on the box, use a label they can easily cut off. If a bad guy (or opportunist) sees a rank on a package, they might decide it's someone worth mailing a letter bomb or poison fruitcake to. Or maybe they'll mail it to the return address.

Holidays

The one consistent annoyance about working on a holiday is dealing with the rest of the world , since they aren't.

Counterinsurgency

I don't have time to go into the details, unfortunately, so here's the big picture: It isn't a guerrilla or terrorist attack that brings down a nation. It is that nation's overreaction to it. This is a well established principle of counterinsurgency warfare, and it's the reason Al-Qaeda would like to see John McCain elected president.

Time article

Cold war

Given the political chicanery and inefficacy I've observed in this country in my lifetime, looking back, I'm actually quite surprised some crazy SOB didn't get us all killed during the Cold war.

Numbers

Just a quick note, not sure if I've posted this before or not: There are more contractors in Iraq than there are U.S. soldiers (190k vers 140k). Reference: Time.

Morons

Okay. Here's one reason why I hate watching TV news.

Just saw a story on a prominent 24 hour cable news station about how U.S. soldiers traveling to the middle east have to pay the airlines the extra bag fee for their bags. The VFW is angry about this, saying that a young soldier heading off to war shouldn't have to pay such a fee, and I would be too. In fact, I think I have more right, since I have been deploying for 5 years, and I've been paying overweight and extra bag fees the whole time. Except for one thing: The military reimburses us for all legitimate travels costs, including those fees. Everyone, when they travel on the government dime, has to file a travel voucher. So whether you get charged a fee (on your legally required government credit card) or not, you're still filing paperwork.

Clearly no one involved in publishing this story bothered to have even a 5 minute conversation about it with any military member. If you really want to find out about what you should be angry about, study up on the DTS system for filing travel vouchers and what a waste of time it is for all of us.


Baggage fee story